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Abstract 
On September 15, 2008, the big three rating agencies downgraded AIG’s credit ratings 
multiple levels, exacerbating liquidity strains that the company was experiencing due to 
increasing cash demands by securities borrowers and collateral calls by credit default swap 
(CDS) customers. To prevent AIG from filing for bankruptcy, the Federal Reserve (the Fed) 
announced on the following day that, pursuant to its emergency powers, it would provide 
the company with an $85 billion Revolving Credit Facility (RCF). The RCF was secured by 
AIG assets and interests in its subsidiaries and required AIG to grant the US Department of 
the Treasury a 79.9% voting equity interest in the company. Although AIG leaned heavily 
upon the RCF, the credit line was insufficient to stabilize AIG. The government later provided 
additional assistance and eased the terms of the RCF. In January 2011, AIG paid the last of 
the amounts owed to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) under the RCF, ending 
it. The FRBNY netted $6.4 billion in capitalized interest and fees from the program. 
Keywords: credit facility, preferred shares, trust, liquidity
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At a Glance  
On September 15, 2008, American 
International Group, Inc. (AIG) experienced 
a devastating liquidity crunch after three 
major rating agencies downgraded the 
company multiple credit levels (US GAO 
2011b, 6). AIG’s credit downgrades, 
Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy, and general 
market panic led AIG counterparties to 
make mass collateral calls on credit default 
swap (CDS) contracts with AIG Financial 
Products, causing the insurance giant to 
assess its balance sheet to provide cash for 
withdrawals, nearly leading AIG to declare 
for bankruptcy (US GAO 2011b, 4–7).  
The Federal Reserve Board of Governors 
(FRB) authorized the Revolving Credit 
Facility (RCF), a secured $85 billion 
emergency credit line, with a maturity of 
two years, to provide liquidity for AIG and 
its subsidiaries for the repayment of all 
debt obligations (FRB 2008b). The RCF was 
secured on AIG’s assets, which included 
equity interests in its foreign and domestic insurance subsidiaries, debt indentures with 
outside firms, and loans AIG offered via credit facilities and other support agreements (FRB 
2008c, 5–6). Usage of the RCF was initially subject to an interest rate of three-month LIBOR 
plus 8.5% (with a 3.5% LIBOR floor) and an annual commitment fee on undrawn funds of 
8.5% (–FRB 2008c, 4–5). Additionally, the government was to receive a 79.9% equity 
interest in AIG through the issuance of preferred stock to be held and managed by an 
independent trust established by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) (FRBNY 
2008a, Exhibit D). Prior to the RCF’s execution, the FRBNY advanced $37 billion to AIG 
through a series of demand notes, secured by the same assets and subsidiary equity interests 
as the RCF, with a separate commitment fee on the $85 billion credit line of 2%, or $1.7 billion 
(FRB 2008c, 4). 
Over the next two and a half years, AIG would gradually pay back any drawn credit, often 
through the proceeds received from asset sales and subsidiary transactions (Alvarez 2010, 
8). Treasury and the FRBNY continued to assist AIG during that time, replacing much of the 
RCF debt with new equity investments, and subsequently decreased the amount of the 
FRBNY’s commitment under the RCF (Webel 2017, 11–14). After agreeing on a 
Recapitalization Plan in September 2010, AIG repaid the FRBNY in full on January 14, 2011, 
effectively ending the RCF (FRBNY 2011; Treasury 2011). 
 
Summary of Key Terms 
Purpose: To provide liquidity “to assist AIG in 
meeting its obligations as they come due” and 
“facilitate a process under which AIG will sell certain 
of its businesses in an orderly manner, with the least 
possible disruption to the overall economy” (FRB  
2008b). 
Announcement Date  September 16, 2008 
Operational Date September 22, 2008 
Termination Date  January 14, 2011  
Legal Authority Section 13(3) of the 
Federal Reserve Act 
Initial Commitment $85 billion 
Initial Interest Rate 3-month LIBOR plus 
8.5%; 3.5% LIBOR floor 
Initial Commitment Fee 8.5% 
Peak Utilization  $72.3 billion on October 
28, 2008 
Total Amount Loaned  $140.3 billion 
American International Group, Inc.:  
The Revolving Credit Facility 
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The RCF achieved its main goal of providing immediate liquidity to a troubled AIG, quelling 
the effects of liquidity drains long enough for the government to implement additional 
programs of assistance to AIG in October 2008, November 2008, March 2009, and at various 
other points (Webel 2017, 9–14). Although the RCF maturity date was extended to five years 
(until September 2013), the FRBNY was repaid entirely by January 2011, almost three years 
ahead of schedule, and per the Fed, at a net gain (Anderson 2012; US GAO 2011b, 7). Still, 
some critics argue that the RCF aggravated a moral hazard problem that incentivizes firms 
to act, invest, and operate recklessly and under the assumption that the government will 
supply liquidity and capital when investments go awry (Choi 2013, 73). 
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American International Group: United States Context 
 
GDP 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU 
Converted to USD) 
$14,681.5 billion in 2007 
$14,559.5 billion in 2008 
 
GDP per Capita 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU 
Converted to USD) 
$47,976 in 2007 
$48,383 in 2008 
 
Sovereign Credit Rating (5-Year 
Senior Debt) 
 











Size of Banking System 
 
$9,231.7 billion in total assets in 2007 
$9,938.3 billion in total assets in 2008 
Size of Banking System as a 
Percentage of GDP 
 
62.9% in 2007 
68.3% in 2008 
Size of Banking System as a 
Percentage of Financial System 
 
Banking system assets equal to 29.0% of financial 
system in 2007 
Banking system assets equal to 30.5% of financial 
system in 2008 
5-Bank Concentration of 
Banking System 
 
43.9% of total banking assets in 2007 
44.9% of total banking assets in 2008 
Foreign Involvement in Banking 
System 22% of total banking assets in 2007 
18% of total banking assets in 2008 
Government Ownership of 
Banking System 
0% of banks owned by the state in 2008 
Existence of Deposit Insurance 100% insurance on deposits up to $100,000 for 
2007 
100% insurance on deposits up to $250,000 for 
2008 
Sources: Bloomberg; World Bank Global Financial Development Database; World Bank, 










In 2008, American International Group, Inc. (AIG) had more than 76 million customers in 
nearly 140 countries, offering life, health, corporate, property, and casualty insurance, 
among other types, and in many instances was the largest issuer of those insurance plans 
(FRBNY 2012). As of June 30, 2008, while AIG’s balance sheet had approximately $1 trillion 
in assets (AIG 2008, 50), AIG had a notional exposure of $441 billion under a super senior 
credit default swaps (CDS) portfolio managed by AIG Financial Products (AIGFP), a 
subsidiary formed in 1987 (AIG 2008, 120). Of the $441 billion, $307 billion was written 
primarily as capital relief for European financial institutions (AIG 2008, 120). AIGFP had 
substantial exposures to the US housing market via CDS on multisector collateralized debt 
obligations (CDOs) and direct holdings of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) 
(COP 2010, 27). 
In the 2008, AIG reported its second  quarter results: (its third consecutive quarter of) losses, 
totaling more than $18 billion (AIG 2008). Despite this, the company raised $20 billion in 
private capital in May 2008 through common stock, hybrid securities, and debt financing (US 
GAO 2011b, 19). However, those funds were unable to satisfy AIG’s liquidity needs at the 
time (US GAO 2011b, 19–24). In July 2008, new AIG CEO Robert B. Willumstad reached out 
to the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY), Timothy F. Geithner, and 
requested access to the Federal Reserve’s (the Fed’s) discount window to help AIG address 
liquidity problems in its securities lending portfolio and collateral calls on AIGFP’s CDS (COP 
2010, 58) Geithner believed that providing liquidity to AIG at that moment would intensify 
creditor runs on AIG (COP 2010, 58). As losses continued to mount toward the end of the 
summer, investors saw AIG as a risky investment, and it was unknown as to how much 
further AIG could fall and whether AIG could pay back any loans in the future (COP 2010, 58–
59). 
In early September 2008, Willumstad again reached out to the FRBNY for public consultation 
and aid, while trying to raise capital in the private sector again. During the September 13–14 
weekend, the company rejected two proposals from private equity firms and their partners 
(US GAO 2011b, 22–23). AIG also discussed with the New York state insurance department 
the possibility of regulatory relief to allow it to temporarily access $20 billion from its 
insurance company subsidiaries, but this proposal was never finalized (GAO 2011b, 28–29; 
Moriarty 2010, 5–6; and Willumstad 2010, 4). Collateral calls on CDS positions continued to 
drain AIG’s cash, leading officials to believe AIG could avoid bankruptcy for just another week 
or two (Willumstad 2010, 4–5). Below, Figure 1 shows the increasing collateral postings AIG 









Figure 1: AIG Quarterly Collateral Postings to CDS Counterparties from December 31, 
2007, through September 2008 (dollars in millions) 
Collateral Posting by 
Portfolio 
12/31/2007 03/31/2008 06/30/2008 09/30/2008 
Foreign Regulatory Capital 0 212 319 443 
Multisector CDO Arbitrage 2,718 7,590 13,241 31,469 
Corporate Arbitrage 161 368 259 902 
Total 2,879 8,170 13,819 32,814 
Source: SIGTARP 2009. 
During the week leading up to AIG’s rescue, projections of AIG’s capital shortfall rose on a 
daily basis, with values growing from $20 billion to $40 billion and eventually close to 
$80 billion (Dash and Sorkin 2008).  
On the morning of Monday, September 15, FRBNY President Geithner initiated an effort to 
have a private consortium—led by JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Goldman Sachs—arrange a 
$75 billion syndicated loan for AIG, with 15 financial institutions lending $5 billion each 
(FCIC 2011, 349; SIGTARP 2009, 8; and US GAO 2011b, 34). But the bankruptcy of Lehman 
Brothers, also that morning, made it impossible to bring private lenders into the deal, Fed 
officials told the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) (FCIC 2011, 349).  
On the afternoon of Monday, September 15, the big three credit rating agencies—Moody’s 
Investors Service, Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services, and Fitch Ratings—all downgraded 
AIG’s credit ratings significantly (US GAO 2011b, 6). For the changes in AIG’s ratings, see 
Figure 2 below. AIG, one of the largest insurers in the world, faced potential bankruptcy. 
Figure 2: AIG’s Credit Ratings Downgrade by Agency 
 Standard & Poor’s Moody’s Fitch 
September 14, 2008 AA- Aa3 AA- 
September 15, 2008 A- A2 A 
Levels Changed -3 -2 -2 
Sources: FCIC 2011; Bloomberg. 
Program Description 
On September 16, 2008, the Federal Reserve Board of Governors (FRB) passed a resolution 
invoking Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 (12 U.S.C. § 343)  to allow the 
FRBNY to extend to AIG a loan of up to $85 billion, based on a finding of “unusual and exigent 
circumstances” —“that the disorderly failure of AIG was likely to have a systemic effect on 
financial markets that were already experiencing a significant level of fragility and that the 
best alternative available was to lend to AIG to assist it in meeting its obligations in an orderly 
manner as they came due” (FRB 2008a, 4; GPO 2007a).4 The FRBNY could extend credit after 
it determined that AIG was unable to secure adequate credit accommodations from other 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
4 The related press release used similar wording but also expanded on potential consequences—“a disorderly 
failure of AIG could add to already significant levels of financial market fragility and lead to substantially 
higher borrowing costs, reduced household wealth, and materially weaker economic performance” (FRB 
2008b). 
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sources and the loan would have to be “secured to the satisfaction” of the FRBNY. (FRA 
1913).  
To “best protect the interests of the US government and taxpayers,” the Board discussed 
“collateralizing the loan with all the assets of AIG, receiving a 79.9 percent equity interest in 
AIG, and reserving the right to veto the payment of dividends to common and preferred 
shareholders” (FRB 2008a, 4). (All these terms were eventually included in the Revolving 
Credit Facility, or RCF.) The loan would “not exceed a period of 24 months,” with the 
possibility of a future extension by the FRBNY, through consultation with the FRB (FRB 
2008a, 4). 
The FRBNY negotiated the Revolving Credit Facility with AIG, the primary objective of which 
was “to protect the US and global economies and the American people from the devastating 
effects that [AIG’s] disorderly failure would have caused in the then prevailing economic 
environment.” (FRBNY 2012). Moreover, providing sufficient liquidity would prevent AIG’s 
failure and help AIG “make appropriate dispositions of certain assets over time” (FRBNY 
2012). As part of the credit extension, the government required CEO Willumstad to step 
down as chief executive of AIG (Geithner 2010, 1778-81). Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson 
recommended former Allstate CEO Ed Liddy as Willumstad’s replacement and Liddy 
accepted (Geithner  2010, 1810-11). Liddy accepted the position of chairman and CEO of AIG       
and was voted in by the Board of directors. 
Credit Advanced to AIG Prior to Close of the RCF 
Between the announcement of the RCF on September 16 and September 19, the FRBNY 
advanced $37 billion to AIG, at a 14% interest rate, in four installments for the purpose of 
liquidity assistance to meet collateral calls and for general corporate purposes (FRB 2008c, 
4). The FRBNY made these advances to AIG via four promissory notes that were payable on 
demand to the FRBNY, and which “were secured by a wide range of assets of AIG, including 
its ownership interest in certain subsidiaries.” (FRB 2008c, 4). They had an initial 2% 
commitment fee, or $1.7 billion, of the aggregate $85 billion credit line (FRB 2008c, 4). Figure 
3 below outlines the four demand note advances. Upon signing of the Credit Agreement and 
related documents establishing the RCF by all parties on September 22, the four demand 
promissory notes and any interest due on them were “cancelled and amounts due under such 
notes effectively were transferred to the revolving credit facility” and allocated toward the 
$85 billion commitment of the RCF (FRBNY 2008a, 33–34; FRB 2008c, 44).  
Figure 3: Four Demand Note Agreements, prior to RCF Execution 
Date Amount 
September 16, 2008 $14 billion 
September 17, 2008 $14 billion 
September 18, 2008 $6 billion 
September 19, 2008 $3 billion 
Total $37 billion 
Source: FRBNY 2008b, Preamble. 
The RCF Credit Agreement 
The FRB and AIG entered into the Credit Agreement, providing the terms of the RCF loan 
commitment on September 22, 2008 (FRBNY 2008a). The RCF provided AIG an $85 billion 
credit line (which included the $37 billion in demand advances). Any loans that AIG drew 
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down under the RCF were due on maturity of the Credit Agreement, after approximately 24 
months, on September 22, 2010, and carried an interest rate of three-month LIBOR plus 
8.5% (FRB 2008b; FRBNY 2008a, 21). Interest was payable quarterly by increasing the 
outstanding principal by the amount of such interest, and any such added amount would also 
bear interest (FRBNY 2008a, 21). The interest rate, however, had a floor, where at minimum, 
the interest due with respect to the RCF loans could be no less than 3.5% per annum (the 
LIBOR floor) (FRBNY 2008a, 10). 
In addition, the Credit Agreement provided for an annual commitment fee of 8.5% per 
annum, payable quarterly, with respect to undrawn amounts under the RCF (FRBNY 2008a, 
21). The commitment fee was payable by adding such amount to the outstanding principal 
and would bear interest until paid (FRBNY 2008a, 21). AIG could have elected to pay any 
interest and fees in cash, rather than having these capitalized. However, any amounts not 
paid by the maturity date would be subject to a late fee of the then current interest rate, plus 
an additional 2% (FRBNY 2008a, 22). Over the lifetime of the RCF, the terms of the Credit 
Agreement were modified to better facilitate AIG’s ability to repay loans, to ensure that credit 
ratings were improved or maintained, and to ensure the full repayment to the FRBNY for its 
assistance to AIG (US GAO 2011b, 7–11).5 
As the parent company, AIG was the only entity allowed to authorize loan requests from the 
FRBNY and repayments for the RCF (FRBNY 2008a). The protocol for loan requests varied 
based on the size of the request and on the amount of requests submitted within a set period 
of days (FRBNY 2008a, 21). To borrow or prepay loan amounts, the FRBNY required advance 
notice from AIG of between one and three business days, subject to the amount AIG would 
request or would prepay (FRBNY 2008a, 21). AIG could not have requested more than two 
borrowings in excess of $10 billion each within any five business days without prior consent 
from the FRBNY (FRBNY 2008a, 20). 
Although the total amount that AIG could borrow under the RCF (the Commitment) was set 
at $85 billion, the Commitment could have been reduced, according to the Credit Agreement 
(FRBNY 2008a, 4). With the consent of the FRBNY, AIG could have terminated, or 
permanently reduced, the Commitment under the RCF, as long as the Commitment was not 
reduced to less than the principal amount drawn at that time (FRBNY 2008a, 27). The partial 
reductions were also required to be at minimum amounts of $50 million and at an integral 
multiple of $10 million (FRBNY 2008a, 22). 
Loans under the RCF were secured by most of AIG’s assets, which included the stock of 
practically all of AIG’s regulated subsidiaries (domestic and foreign) and the stock of its 
primary nonregulated subsidiaries (FRB 2008b). Additionally, as further consideration and 
protection of the taxpayer-funded RCF, AIG was to issue to the government an equity interest 
as discussed below in the Equity Interests subsection.  
The FRBNY expected AIG to repay the loans primarily through the sale of assets. Section 2.10 
of the Credit Agreement stated that “any and all Net Cash Proceeds received from an Asset 
Sale must be used to prepay outstanding Loans and accrued or unpaid interest, no later than 
the fifth business day after the sale” (FRBNY 2008a, 23). AIG was also required to use the 
cash proceeds from other major transactions, such as equity issuances, dividends received 
from subsidiaries, and any excess cash on hand, to repay loans (FRBNY 2008a, 23). AIG was 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
5 These modifications included waiver and then suspension of the commitment fee and reduction of the 
interest rate, among other adjustments. 
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also subject to a number of customary restrictions on its operations, such as not taking on 
additional debt or equity interests (FRBNY 2008a, 42 - 48). 
The Guarantee and Pledge Agreement 
Concomitant with the execution of the Credit Agreement, the FRBNY and AIG signed a 
Guarantee and Pledge Agreement, pursuant to which AIG provided a guarantee and security 
interests in certain collateral to secure the FRBNY’s commitment. AIG guaranteed that any 
net proceeds from the collateral, whether by sale or another transaction, would be paid to 
the FRBNY (AIG/FRBNY 2008, 2). The Guarantee and Pledge Agreement considered assets 
to include equity interests in subsidiaries in the form of capital stock shares, preexisting 
financing agreements and debt indentures, preexisting credit facilities, and loan agreements 
(AIG/FRBNY 2008, Schedule 4).6 The Guarantee and Pledge Agreement limited the equity 
interests FRBNY would hold as collateral in any foreign subsidiary to 66% of all voting equity 
interests due to “the adverse tax consequences for AIG or its subsidiaries” that came with 
owning more (AIG/FRBNY 2008, 6). 
Equity Interests 
In extending credit to AIG, the Fed insisted that the government receive an equity interest in 
the company as well. This feature had several purposes: (1) to provide compensation to the 
government for the risks it was taking, (2) to address moral hazard, and (3) to provide the 
government some control over the company and protect its interests, and (4) to provide 
some upside benefit to the taxpayers if the company should rebound. (Geithner 2010, 1775-
81). 
AIG was to issue to an independent trust, “established for the benefit of the United States 
Treasury,” 100,000 shares of Series C Perpetual, Convertible, Participating Preferred Stock 
(Series C Preferred Stock), capable of being converted to 79.9% of outstanding AIG common 
stock, with antidilution provisions attached (FRB 2008c, 7; FRBNY 2008a, Exhibit D).     The 
Preferred Stock also carried a liquidation preference of $5.00 per share, or $500,000 in 
aggregate (FRBNY 2008a, Exhibit D). It would also have shareholder voting rights on all 
common stockholder issues, except for any proposals that affected its equity stake, which 
included the issuance of new common stock (FRBNY 2008a, Exhibit D).  
Originally, the trust could have converted the Series C Preferred Stock into 79.9% of the 
outstanding shares of AIG common stock, but this provision was later adjusted to 77.9% due 
to other equity interests in AIG acquired by the government (Treasury 2008).7 (See 
discussion at “The First Restructuring Plan” subsection in the “Outcomes” section.) If 
converted, the government would have effectively held majority ownership in AIG (–FRBNY 
2008a, Exhibit D). However, the Series C Preferred Stock could not be issued until the trust 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
6 A portion of secured assets included equity interests in AIG subsidiaries such as: AIG BG Holdings, Inc.; AIG 
Capital Corporation; AIG Federal Savings Banks; AIG Retirement Services; AIG Trading Group; American 
International Underwriters Overseas, Ltd.; American Life Insurance Company; Transatlantic Holdings, Inc.; 
AIG Life Holdings LLC; AIG Castle Holdings LLC; and AIG Castle Holdings II LLC. AIG also included $1.16 billion 
in financial instruments to secure the RCF loans, as well as 64 financial agreements held by certain 
subsidiaries (COP 2010). 
7 The equity interest was specifically limited to be below 80% of the outstanding AIG common stock, the point 
at which AIG would have had to be consolidated into the government’s balance sheet, something the 
government wished to avoid but ultimately did not because at one point it owned 92% of the company’s 
common stock (COP 2010, 71–72). 
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was established on January 16, 2009,8 and the necessary number of shares was authorized 
on March 4, 2009, which required a special shareholders meeting to vote on the issuance of 
new common stock sufficient to allow the trust to convert the preferred shares (FRBNY 
2008a, Exhibit D). (See discussion at “The Second Restructuring Plan” subsection in the 
“Outcomes” section.) 
The trust could receive any dividends paid on the common stock, equal to “dividends 
attributable to the [number of shares of common stock equal to 79.9%], minus the dividends, 
if any paid with respect to shares of common stock previously issued on any partial 
conversion” (FRBNY 2008a, Exhibit D). 
Outcomes 
The FRBNY’s outstanding assistance to AIG under the RCF peaked at $72.3 billion in late 
October 2008 (FRB n.d.). However, AIG continued to experience losses on subprime RMBS 
investments and collateral calls on CDS contracts during the third quarter of 2008 (Salter 
2013, 23). In addition, Fed officials became concerned that the size and terms of the RCF 
would lead the credit agencies to further downgrade AIG’s rating—the large RCF loan had 
substantially increased AIG’s leverage ratio, and the high interest rate and commitment fee 
had lowered its interest coverage ratio (SIGTARP 2009, 12–13). Leverage and interest 
coverage ratio are two metrics that rating agencies use to assess a company’s financial 
strength. (FRB 2008d, 4; SIGTARP 2009, 13) The government acted quickly to lower AIG’s 
leverage by replacing debt with equity, and to ease its cash flow pressures, by amending the 
terms imposed by the original RCF agreements (FRB 2008d, 4–7). 
The First Restructuring Plan. The FRBNY and Treasury announced the first of two 
restructuring plans on November 10, 2008 (FRB 2008d). Under this plan, Treasury would 
invest $40 billion in AIG through the recently enacted Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) 
in exchange for four million shares of AIG Series D Preferred Stock and a warrant  to purchase 
2% of AIG’s outstanding common stock (Treasury 2011). The preferred shares provided for 
cumulative dividends and carried a liquidation Preference equal to $40 billion. (Treasury 
2011, 1). 
The plan indicated that AIG was to use proceeds from the Series D stock sale to pay down the 
amounts borrowed under the RCF. (Treasury 2011, 3) The repayment allowed the FRBNY to 
decrease the Commitment maximum from $85 billion to $60 billion, as shown in Figure 4 
(SIGTARP 2009, 4).9 The remaining $5 billion was allocated as cash on the balance sheet 
(YPFS 2018b).  
The plan substantially eased the terms of the Credit Agreement, which had been intentionally 
designed to be more onerous than private sector alternatives (GAO 2011b, 123–130). The 
Fed stated the purpose was to “enhance AIG’s ability to repay the credit extended in full” 
while allowing more time for the company to dispose of assets in an orderly manner (FRB 
2008d, 6). The new agreement effectively cut the RCF interest rate almost in half, from 12% 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
8 The reasons for the delay in establishing the trust are not entirely clear but could be related to the fact that 
the shares were not yet available and that the government was engaging in other transactions with AIG such 
as Treasury’s Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) investment, which might have seemed more pressing. 
9 For a description of the other economic elements of the First Restructuring Plan, see Buchholtz 2021a. 
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to 6.5%.10 (See Figure 5.) The new agreement also extended the maturity of the RCF loan 
from two years to five years (until September 22, 2013) and slashed the commitment fee 
from 8.5% to 0.75%. (FRB 2008d, 6). The 79.9% equity interest of the Series C Preferred 
Stock issued pursuant to the Credit Agreement was also decreased to 77.9%, adjusting for 
the 2% equity under the Series D Warrant issued to Treasury and maintaining the 
government’s overall stake in AIG under 80% (Treasury 2008).11,12  
The Second Restructuring Plan. The government restructured the agreement a second time 
on March 2, 2009, after AIG reported a $99 billion net loss for 2008 (FRB 2009a, 3).  
The FRBNY amended the Credit Agreement to remove the 3.5% LIBOR floor, allowing the 
interest rate to float down if the base rate did, which occurred immediately (FRB 2009a, 6). 
(See Figure 5.) The Fed also decided that as partial repayment of the RCF, the FRBNY would 
accept nonvoting preferred interests in two AIG special purpose vehicles (SPVs) (FRB 2009a, 
6). AIG would form the SPVs to hold 100% of the common stock in two of its largest life 
insurance holding companies: American Life Insurance Company (ALICO SPV) and American 
International Assurance Company Ltd. (AIA SPV) (FRB 2009a, 6).  
In December 2009, the FRBNY received $16 billion in preferred interests in the AIA SPV and 
$9 billion in preferred interests in the ALICO SPV, each with a liquidation preference of equal 
value (FRB n.d.). In return, the Commitment of $60 billion, and the then outstanding balance 
of approximately $42,468 billion, were each decreased by the $25 billion aggregate value of 
the SPV preferred interests (FRBNY 2009a, 4; FRB n.d.). For more information on the Second 
Restructuring Plan, please refer to Buchholtz and Lawson 2021a. 
Additionally, on March 4, AIG issued the Series C Preferred Stock to the AIG Credit Facility 
Trust (the trust). (AIG 2009a). The FRBNY established the trust on January 16, 2009, 
appointing three independent trustees to manage the trust in consultation with Treasury, 
based on their having “integrity, impeccable reputations in the marketplace and a unique 
combination of experience successfully leading major corporations and working in the 
public sector” (FRBNY 2009b; FRBNY 2010a). The FRBNY appointed Jill M. Considine, 
Chester B. Feldberg, and Douglas Foshee as trustees (FRBNY 2010a). For more information 
on the AIG Credit Facility Trust and its role managing the Series C Preferred Stock, please 
refer to Buchholtz and Lawson 2021b.  
The Recapitalization Plan. On September 30, 2010, the government announced that it had 
come to terms with AIG on a Recapitalization Plan for the RCF, which would result in the 
repayment of all amounts outstanding under the RCF and cancellation of the Commitment 
and RCF (Treasury 2010). The FRBNY, Treasury, AIG, two related insurance SPV 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
10The terms were revised from three-month LIBOR plus 8.5% to three-month LIBOR plus 3.0% and continued 
to include a 3.5% LIBOR floor (Buchholtz 2021a, 6).  
11 See the discussion at Key Design Decisions No. 13. 
12 Also, under the restructuring plan, the Fed announced that it would create two companies to acquire 
troubled mortgage-backed securities and CDOs from AIG and gradually sell them as market conditions 








subsidiaries, and the trust all signed a Master Transaction Agreement dated December 8, 
2010 (AIG et al 2010). 
In January 2011, AIG repaid to the FRBNY the $20.6 billion of debt outstanding under the 
RCF, with the proceeds from two separate transactions involving the two SPV insurance 
subsidiaries (AIG et al 2010, 28–29; FRBNY 2011). This transaction effectively ended the RCF 
and terminated the Credit Agreement; all amounts due were paid in full (AIG et al 2010, 28–
29; FRBNY 2011).  
Also, as part of the Recapitalization Plan, the trust converted the Series C Preferred Stock 
into 563 million shares of AIG common stock and transferred that common stock to the 
Treasury’s General Fund (AIG et al 2010). As a result, when added to other shares that had 
been acquired, the Treasury owned an aggregate equity stake in AIG of 92% (Treasury 
2011). As a result of the transfer, the trust disbanded (AIG et al 2010). 
FRBNY had to seek professional aid from a number of different vendors in order to help 
manage and administer the RCF, through investment banking advisory, due diligence 
services, legal services, and valuation services (US GAO 2011a, 168).  
See Figure 4 for the changes in the Commitment and the outstanding balance under the RCF 
at different points during its existence.  
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Figure 4: Changes to the Revolving Credit Facility Commitment for Specific Dates from 
September 2008 to January 20111 
Date  




Balance under RCF 
(in billions)2 
Comment 
September 16, 2008  $85,000 $0  
The FRBNY announced $85 billion 
emergency credit line for AIG. 
September 22, 2008  $85,000 $42,0663 
Revolving Credit Facility (RCF) is 
executed and officially implemented.  
November 10, 2008  $85,000 $63,376 
First Restructuring Plan (1stRP) is 
announced. 
November 25, 2008  $60,000 $35,430 
1st RP is executed. 
$40 billion TARP investment from 
Treasury helped pay down RCF 
principal balance owed. Overall 
Commitment reduced. 
March 2, 2009 $60,000 $42,468 
Second Restructuring Plan (2ndRP) is 
announced. 
December 1, 2009 $35,000 $21,652 
2nd RP is executed. 
$16 billion in preferred shares in AIA 
SPV and $9 billion in preferred shares 
in ALICO SPV applied to RCF as debt 
forgiveness.  
May 6, 2010 $34,000 $28,384 
Proceeds from sale of HighStar Port 
Partners, L.P. and other small AIG 
subsidiaries applied to partially repay 
RCF balance. 
August 20, 2010 $30,000 $20,717 
Proceeds from sale of International 
Lease Finance Corporation debt 
issuances partially repay RCF balance. 
September 30, 2010  $30,000 $20,018 Recapitalization Plan announced. 
January 14, 2011 $0  $0  
AIG completed repayment of the RCF 
using proceeds from the AIA and 
ALICO transactions.  
Notes: 1 Does not include all intervening transactions 
2 The outstanding balances include any capitalized interest and fees in addition to the principal balance debt 
from the RCF. 
3 Outstanding balance includes $37 billion advanced to AIG between September 16 and September 19 via four 
demand notes.   
Sources: COP 2010; FRB n.d. 
 
II. Key Design Decisions 
1. The Revolving Credit Facility was created as part of a multifaceted intervention by 
the government. 
The Revolving Credit Facility, approved and announced on September 16, 2008, a day after 
the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, was the first of what would be a large package of 
assistance established by the government to address the insurance giant’s severe liquidity 
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and capital issues (FRB 2008b; FRBNY 2008a). Interventions would be funded by the FRBNY 
and Treasury; would include direct loans, asset purchases, and capital injections; and would 
become the government’s largest intervention for any one entity, totaling $182.3 billion 
(Treasury 2013, 14). 
2. The Federal Reserve authorized the RCF pursuant to its emergency lending 
authority under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act. 
Originally having discouraged AIG from seeking a loan based on Section 13(3), the FRBNY 
over the September 13–14 weekend considered other routes of assistance for AIG. These 
included providing access to the Primary Dealer Credit Facility, seeking financing through 
the Federal Home Loan Bank System, and finding a private sector solution for funding via 
acquisition (US GAO 2011b, 19–31). FRBNY officials told the US Government Accountability 
Office (US GAO) that the amount of credit required by the parent would be too large for any 
AIG subsidiary to obtain, and that, at that point, the timing was too tight to consider 
alternatives to the Fed credit line (US GAO 2011b, 19–24, 42–43). 
Nevertheless, once Lehman Brothers failed, the Federal Reserve Board authorized the 
FRBNY to enter into the RCF pursuant to Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, the 
Board’s emergency lending authority, which has three basic requirements: (i) the Board 
must determine that “unusual and exigent” circumstances exist, by the affirmative vote of at 
least five members; (ii) the loans must be secured to the satisfaction of the lending reserve 
bank; and (iii) the lending reserve bank “must have obtained evidence that adequate credit 
was not available from other banking institutions” (GPO 2007a, 112). In determining that 
exigent and unusual circumstances existed, the Board considered the size of AIG and that it 
“faced the imminent prospect of declaring bankruptcy.” Further, it also considered “the effect 
of AIG's disorderly failure on financial markets, the position of the Department of the 
Treasury on an extension of credit to AIG, and the circumstances presented by this situation 
as compared with situations recently confronted by the Board.” In light of these facts, the 
Board concluded “that the disorderly failure of AIG was likely to have a systemic effect on 
financial markets that were already experiencing a significant level of fragility and that the 
best alternative available was to lend to AIG to assist it in meeting its obligations in an orderly 
manner as they came due” (FRB 2008a, 3–4).  
Thus, the Board authorized the FRBNY to extend the RCF consistent with the general terms 
also approved by it, although the Board did not approve the ultimate terms that were 
included in the Credit Agreement, some of which differed from the term sheet approved by 
the Board (FRB 2008a, 3–4; US Court of Federal Claims 2015, 20). 
Former FRBNY President Geithner has provided further elaboration on the Board’s decision. 
When Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy on September 15, it was received like a 
hurricane heightening panic throughout financial markets and causing already tightened 
credit markets to all but freeze. (US GAO 2011b, 7). Over the prior week, AIG’s extreme 
liquidity needs, had worsened and two rounds of seeking a private sector solution had failed; 
it did not seem that there was adequate private funding available to meet AIG’s needs (US 
GAO 2011b, 35). In the case of aiding an individual firm, and more specifically,  a nonbank 
institution such as AIG, the objective in Geithner’s view was to “minimize or mitigate the 
damage to the economy” (Geithner 2014b, 1708). 
Finally, authorization under Section 13(3) also required that the credit could be “secured to 
the satisfaction” of the lending Reserve Bank (GPO 2007a). Different from the case of 
Lehman, where its assets were difficult to assess and were ultimately deemed by FRBNY 
inadequate to serve as collateral against a loan of the size needed, AIG’s insurance 
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subsidiaries were believed to be relatively sound and could continue to provide strong cash 
flows or could be sold to make up for any losses on the overall company and repay any 
federal assistance (Geithner 2014a, 193; Geithner 2019, 23). By taking a security interest in 
the majority of AIG’s assets, including the equity in its insurance subsidiaries, FRBNY 
believed that its loan would be adequately secured.  
3. The RCF was administered by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 
The RCF was administered by the FRBNY. As it was similar to other types of lending that the 
Reserve Bank did, the RCF, per se, did not at first pose particular administrative challenges. 
However, as discussed in Wiggins et al. 2021, because of the size and nature AIG’s businesses, 
being a nonbank insurance company not usually dealt with by the FRBNY, certain challenges 
arose in managing the AIG stakeholders and later other elements of the government’s 
response. 
Consistent with standard practice, Section 5.04 the Credit Agreement signed in September 
2008 required AIG to provide the FRBNY with certain financial statements on a periodic 
basis so that it could monitor its operations—“its consolidated balance sheet and related 
statements of income, stockholders’ equity and cash flows showing the financial condition of 
[AIG] and its consolidated Subsidiaries” within 90 days of the end of the fiscal year, with 
unaudited reports coming sooner (FRBNY 2008a, 35–36). Section 5.05 also imposed detailed 
additional reporting requirements, such as in the case of a default, a change in AIG’s 
corporate rating, or judicial proceedings made against AIG or its subsidiaries. (FRBNY 2008a, 
38–39).  
4. Both the Federal Reserve and Treasury were active in publicly explaining the 
details of the RCF in Congressional hearings and to both industry insiders and the 
public.  
Given the size of the RCF and the overall government assistance to AIG, there has been much 
disclosure and interest in its details. Often, the terms, details, and utilization of the RCF were 
discussed in connection with other government action. However, from the beginning, there 
were also singular communications regarding it. 
In testimonies to the Congressional Oversight Panel (COP), officials at FRBNY and Treasury 
repeatedly stated they had a “binary” choice between letting AIG fail or rescue the entire 
institution (COP 2010, Executive Summary). Tom Baxter, who was the General Counsel at 
the FRBNY, agreed with this sentiment and suggested that the consequences of bankruptcy 
would have been far worse than a wholesale rescue (COP 2010, Section 254).      
Then–Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben Bernanke testified in front of the Senate 
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs on the RCF’s impact on the firm. “To 
mitigate concerns that [the loan] would exacerbate moral hazard and encourage 
inappropriate risk-taking in the future, the Federal Reserve ensured that the terms of the 
credit extended to AIG imposed significant costs and constraints on the firm’s owners, 
managers, and creditors” (Bernanke 2008). However, significant internal discussions about 
the punitive pricing of the initial terms of the loan were had at the FRBNY. (See Key Design 
Decisions No. 9 for more details.) 
Bernanke, in October of 2008, gave a speech at the National Association for Business 
Economics that also framed the Fed’s loan to AIG in a more systemic way. Bernanke 
explained that, “In the case of AIG, the Federal Reserve and the Treasury judged that a 
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disorderly failure of AIG would have severely threatened global financial stability and the 
performance of the US economy” (Bernanke 2008). 
The Fed would dramatically alter the terms of the RCF in a Restructuring Plan that was 
released at 6:00 a.m. on November 10, 2008, the same day AIG’s earnings release was made 
because officials anticipated that AIG would show large losses and be a prime target for a 
ratings downgrade (US GAO 2011b, 52–53). Even with less certainty around a downgrade, 
FRBNY officials explained that, “government action still would have been necessary, because 
markets would have punished AIG when it released its earnings report (US GAO 2011b, 53).” 
5. The FRBNY required CEO Robert Willumstad to step down, to be replaced by a new 
CEO recommended by the government. 
The private sector term sheet contained the condition that any possible investment in AIG 
must include the “replacement of AIG senior management, including the chief executive 
officer” (US GAO 2011b, 27).  
Secretary Geithner later stated that the market’s lack of confidence in AIG, or the market’s 
perception, influenced the government’s decision to change AIG’s management and replace 
CEO Willumstad in September 2008 (Geithner 2014b, 1777–1778).  
Secretary Geithner later recalled that Secretary Paulson had suggested Ed Liddy to replace 
Willumstad as AIG CEO “because he was judged as a person with enough relevant, credible 
experience because [Liddy] managed a large insurance company” and because Secretary 
Paulson and his special adviser, Ken Wilson, “had a lot of confidence in [Liddy’s] judgment” 
(Geithner 2014b, 1810). Liddy had experience serving as CEO of Allstate, another major 
insurance company, for eight years. (Geithner, 2014b, 1810). 
6. The FRBNY advanced $37 billion to AIG at a 14% interest rate, prior to the RCF 
becoming fully operational. 
AIG was in dire need for liquidity to meet collateral calls and satisfy large cash demands from 
securities borrowers. On September 16, AIG’s board approved borrowing $14 billion 
through a demand note from the FRBNY, as well as additional demand notes, “as any 
Authorized Officer determines is necessary or appropriate to meet the liquidity needs of 
[AIG] prior to the execution of the definitive documentation of the Credit Facility.” (US Court 
of Federal Claims 2015, 22–23). Secretary Geithner, in his memoir, Stress Test, stated that 
AIG had originally said it would need $4 billion to meet incoming collateral calls for the 
morning of the 16th but that AIG underestimated its cash needs and required $14 billion in 
immediate funds (Geithner 2014a, 196). Ultimately, through September 19, the FRBNY 
advanced $37 billion, evidenced by four Demand Notes payable to the FRBNY and secured 
by a range of AIG assets, prior to the execution of the Credit Agreement (FRBNY 2008b, 1).  
In an interview YPFS conducted with Sarah Dahlgren, Head of the Supervisory Group at the 
FRBNY, Dahlgren said the decision to gradually extend the amounts over the course of four 
days was to ease into the FRBNY’s exposure to AIG (YPFS 2018b). Stress scenarios and 
valuations were updated daily by Ernst & Young (EY) specialists and reported to then–
President Geithner and the rest of the FRBNY’s AIG team each morning, who would decide 
whether or not they were comfortable extending an additional advance (YPFS 2018b). 
The Congressional Oversight Panel’s June 2010 Oversight Report noted that between the 
announcement of the RCF and the actual implementation, Morgan Stanley and EY, whom the 
FRBNY hired for collateral valuation services in part due to their insurance expertise, 
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completed their assessments of AIG’s business (COP 2010, 227). While these assessments 
were in progress, the FRBNY was capable of securing any advances on the collateral that they 
valued as “satisfactory” for the amount extended (COP 2010, 227). The FRBNY argued that 
the ability to advance funds on interest-bearing notes and/or credit agreements was part of 
the Section 13(3) lending authority, which allows the Reserve banks to “discount” or 
purchase paper with interest (COP 2010, 226–227). 
At the execution of the Credit Agreement, the FRBNY transferred over any existing credit and 
payments due from the advances to the RCF and then canceled the four demand notes 
(FRBNY 2008b, 1–2). 
7. The FRBNY initially set the RCF at $85 billion.  
Ultimately, with time playing a major factor, the FRBNY recommended extending a loan to 
AIG on a set of terms that was influenced by the $75 billion term sheet created by the 
unsuccessful private consortium (US GAO 2011b, 34–35). The FRBNY stated that it wanted 
to adhere to terms similar to those that the private sector group would have received in 
order to ensure taxpayers would receive a deal of equal or greater value (COP 2010, 71). 
However, some terms were altered by the FRBNY.  
While the term sheet had proposed lending AIG $75 billion, the FRBNY added $10 billion as 
a “cushion … in anticipation of looming liquidity concerns, and because the FRBNY did not 
want to increase the line of credit at a later date” (COP 2010, 71). Also, the term was 
extended, the interest rate was increased, and the commitment fee was decreased. (See Key 
Design Decisions Nos. 9–11 below for further discussion of these terms.)   
According to Federal Reserve Board staff, the loans provided by the RCF were to be utilized 
to “meet preexisting liquidity needs and not for investment in assets that would generate 
returns” (US GAO 2011b, 128). During a hearing of the House Committee on Oversight and 
Government Reform, Secretary Geithner noted that while this initial $85 billion credit line 
“stemmed the bleeding by satisfying AIG’s immediate liquidity needs,” it was not enough and 
required further restructuring and intervention by the government (Geithner 2010, 7). 
8. The FRBNY secured the RCF on AIG’s assets and equity interests in AIG subsidiaries. 
According to Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, any Federal Reserve Bank, in this case 
the FRBNY, making a loan pursuant thereto, must secure any such loan “to the satisfaction of 
the Federal Reserve bank” (GPO 2007a). Geithner, who in 2008 was President of the FRBNY 
further explained this: “In the case of AIG, however, we believed there was a reasonable 
chance that AIG’s assets in the form of its insurance businesses around the world were stable 
enough and valuable enough to support a loan large enough to prevent default.” (Geithner 
2014a, 193) By taking a security interest in the majority of AIG’s assets, including the equity 
in its insurance subsidiaries, FRBNY believed that its loan would be adequately secured  
(Geithner 2019, 23). 
Prior to the execution of the RCF on September 22, 2008, the FRBNY sent a team to AIG to 
“monitor collateral valuation practices, risk management, and exposures of various 
subsidiaries.” Part of their job was to ensure that any funds AIG utilized from the RCF did not 
exceed the value of the collateral (US GAO 2011b, 43).  
In exchange for the credit extended under the RCF, the FRBNY placed a lien on a large portion 
of the assets of the parent company, AIG International Group, Inc., and equity interests in 
AIG’s domestic and foreign regulated subsidiaries (–FRBNY 2008b, Section 3). FRB General 
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Counsel Scott Alvarez said that proceeds from the sales of assets would help AIG repay the 
FRBNY all debt under the RCF (Alvarez 2010, 8). Treasury’s Chief Restructuring Officer, Jim 
Millstein, said the value of the assets would protect taxpayers if AIG did not maintain its 
viability in the long run (Millstein 2010, 7). 
In addition to the collateral posted under the Guarantee and Pledge Agreement, as additional 
consideration for the RCF, the 100,000 shares of Series C Preferred Stock issued also secured 
the loan (FRBNY 2008b, 16–18). 
9. The interest rate was initially set at punitive levels but was later reduced. 
During a crisis, central banks typically lend at interest rates that are lower than market rates 
but high compared to rates in normal times. However, the Fed initially set the interest rate 
and undrawn commitment rate on AIG’s RCF at a level that would be called punitive. (US GAO 
2011b, 123–126).  
The original interest rate of the RCF was three-month LIBOR plus 8.5%, totaling 12%, which 
was greater than the rate the private sector consortium included on its term sheet, which 
was (unspecified) LIBOR plus 6.5% (US GAO 2011b, 125) (Also See Figure 5.) The rationale 
for the increase, according to a GAO analysis of FRB records and interviews with FRBNY 
officials, was to “impose terms sufficiently high to provide incentive for [AIG] to repay 
assistance, whether it borrowed all available or not” (US GAO 2011b, 90). According to 
FRBNY officials, many aspects of the initial terms resembled bankruptcy financing, and 
reflected the company’s condition, the nature of its business, and the large exposure the 
government faced (US GAO 2011b, 126). The officials stated that the RCF’s interest rate was 
higher than the rate the private sector had proposed because the loan had become riskier 
since origination of the private sector’s term sheet, which was prior to Lehman Brothers’ 
bankruptcy, and thus, the terms were intended to be onerous (US GAO 2011b, 126).  
However, later reports reveal that there was concern about the rates, called “onerous,” 
although there were no changes by the time the FRB approved the loan to AIG on September 
16 (US GAO 2011b, 126). FRBNY discount window staff felt they were “extremely high and a 
burden to AIG and thus … contrary to the idea of trying to sustain the firm,” according to the 
GAO (US GAO 2011b, 125). The Fed substantially lowered RCF rates in the first restructuring 
plan of November 2008, after significant internal discussions. Prior to the November 2008 
restructuring, significant figures, such as Dan Jester from Treasury, made their opinions of 
the terms known. Jester “asked FRBNY to ‘rethink the terms of the deal; deal was onerous” 
(US Court of Federal Claims 2015, 31–32). Tom Baxter even characterized the rate as “[m]ore 
of a loan shark” rate (US GAO 2011b, 32). However, FRBNY officials recounted that they 
“intended the original Revolving Credit Facility terms to be onerous, as a way to motivate 
AIG to quickly repay FRBNY and to give AIG an incentive to replace the government lending 
with private financing” (US GAO 2011b, 126). 
Chairman Bernanke noted in a September 2008 Senate hearing that the high rates were 
justified to mitigate concerns that the extension of the $85 billion credit line “would 
exacerbate moral hazard and encourage inappropriate risk-taking in the future” (Bernanke 
2008). Additionally, the FRBNY included a LIBOR floor rate of 3.5% to ensure that even if 
LIBOR rates fell throughout the RCF lifetime, the FRBNY would still be receiving adequate 
interest payments from AIG (US GAO 2011b, 125). 
Per the FRB, the government reduced the RCF interest rate to three-month LIBOR plus 3.0% 
in November 2008 in the First Restructuring Plan in order “to enhance AIG’s ability to repay 
the credit extended in full” (FRB 2008d, 6). The GAO reported that FRBNY believed that 
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lowering the interest rate and the commitment fee (see Key Design Decisions No. 9 and No. 
10), “reflected AIG’s stabilized condition and outlook” after Treasury’s $40 billion 
investment in new equity shares (US GAO 2011b, 129). 
Through the Second Restructuring Plan, the government removed the LIBOR floor to help 
further lower the cost of borrowing under the RCF for AIG (US GAO 2011b, 129–130). Based 
on the then-current LIBOR rates and the outstanding balance on the RCF at the time, AIG 
estimated that the removal of the LIBOR floor would save AIG $1 billion in interest costs 
annually, further alleviating the insurance firm’s ongoing liquidity problems (AIG 2009c). 
Figure 5: Comparison of Private Plan to the RCF and Its Restructuring 
Loan Term 
Private 






Amount $75 billion $85 billion $60 billion Announcement of future 
reduction; later set at 
$35 billion in December 
2009 
Maturity 18 months 24 months 5 years 5 years 












LIBOR +3.0% (elimination 




— 8.5% 0.75% 0.75% 
Commitment 
Fee 
5.0% 2.0%14 N/A N/A 




— — — 




Normal rate +2.0% 
Sources: US GAO 2011b.  
 
10.  The RCF carried a one-time commitment fee of 2%.  
The initial commitment fee was 2% of the aggregate amount available under the RCF. This 
came out to about $1.7 billion dollars (FRB 2008c, 4). While the terms of the FRBNY loan 
were generally harsher than those that the private sector proposed, the commitment fee was 
far less than the 5% that it would have been under the private plan (US GAO 2011b, 125).  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
13 The rate on the private plan was stated generally as LIBOR, while the FRBNY loan specified three-month 
LIBOR. 
14 AIG received a $500,000 credit on FRBNY’s commitment fee, related to payment for preferred shares. 
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11. An annual fee on undrawn funds was initially set at 8.5% and later reduced to 
0.75%. 
Under the Credit Agreement, the FRBNY charged AIG a commitment fee of 8.5% per annum 
of the daily amount of the Commitment that was undrawn, payable on a quarterly basis, 
despite such a fee not being included in the original, private sector initiative that had existed 
prior to Lehman’s failure (FRBNY 2008a, 21; US GAO 2011b, 124–126). The GAO reported 
that the FRBNY included the fee to ensure that taxpayers were being compensated “whether 
AIG used the facility or not” (US GAO 2011b, 126).  
The motives to reduce the commitment fee during the First Restructuring Plan were similar 
to the reason for reducing the interest rate (discussed in Key Design Decisions No. 9), to 
increase the insurer’s capacity to repay its loan (FRB 2008d, 6). Per an FRBNY fact sheet 
circulated in November 2008, the lower interest rate and commitment fee were a sign that 
AIG had begun to stabilize based on the possible impact of a $40 billion equity investment in 
the firm made by Treasury under TARP (US GAO 2011b, 129). 
12. The maturity of the RCF was initially set at two years and later extended to five 
years. 
The initial government term sheet presented to AIG lengthened the private sector maturity 
date of the RCF from 18 months to 24 months in order to provide AIG with additional time 
to repay any borrowings from the FRBNY and to allow AIG ample time to sell off its life 
insurance subsidiaries and securities (US GAO 2011b, 125). 
Treasury stated that the November 2008 extension of the RCF’s maturity date to five years 
(September 22, 2013) was intended to provide AIG “… adequate time to affect its asset 
disposition plan in a manner most likely to achieve favorable returns for the sale of its 
various businesses” (FRB 2008d, 6). Donald Kohn, Vice Chairman of the FRB, testified that 
the actions taken on November 10 were “designed to facilitate AIG's execution of its 
divestiture plan in an orderly manner, and thereby protect the interests of the taxpayers, 
both by preserving financial stability and by giving AIG more time to repay the Federal 
Reserve and return the Treasury's investment” (Kohn 2009). 
13. The government took a 79.9% equity stake in AIG, which was administered by an 
independent trust. 
As a condition of the RCF, AIG was required to issue to the government a 79.9% equity 
interest in the company, which would be held by an independent trust established by FRBNY 
for the benefit of the Treasury. (See Buchholtz and Lawson 2021b.) This feature had several 
purposes: (1) to provide compensation to the government for the risks it was taking, (2) to 
address moral hazard, and (3) to provide the government some control over the company 
and protect its interests, and (4) to provide some upside benefit to the taxpayers if the 
company should rebound. (Geithner 2010, 1775-81, 1811-23). Treasury’s Chief 
Restructuring Officer, Jim Millstein, said the equity interest was included “to provide 
additional compensation to taxpayers for their assistance, and to penalize the shareholders 
of [AIG] for the fact that [AIG] had no alternative but to ask the government for extraordinary 
assistance” (Millstein 2010, 7).  
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AIG’s board of directors met on September 21, 2008, with the expectation that they would 
be issuing to the US government a set of warrants with nonvoting rights.15 However, after a 
proposal by the FRBNY, they agreed upon the issuance of preferred stock instead of warrants 
(US Court of Federal Claims 2015, 25–26). Preferred stock granted Treasury voting rights 
once the stock was issued, while warrants would have granted voting rights only after they 
were exercised (US Court of Federal Claims 2015, 25). To exercise the warrants, Treasury 
would have had to pay an estimated strike price of $30 billion (US Court of Federal Claims 
2015, 25).  
The 79.9% equity stake in AIG was included in the private sector term sheet, according to 
the COP (COP 2010, 72). Although it was extraordinary for the Federal Reserve to insist on 
government equity as a condition for a loan, the FRBNY believed that “the taxpayer should 
receive the same terms and conditions that the private sector wanted,” according to the COP 
(COP 2010, 72). Additionally, a maximum 79.9% stake allowed the trust the largest share of 
ownership without requiring the government to consolidate AIG’s debts and assets onto its 
own balance sheet, as would be required by generally accepted accounting principles 
(GAAP). This approach was similar to the government stakes in rescues earlier that month 
of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. In addition to the preferred stock, the government also 
received warrants to purchase common stock representing 79.9 % of the common stock of 
each government-sponsored enterprise (COP 2010, 71–72).  
In the same vein, the original 79.9% equity stake of the Series C Preferred Stock decreased 
to 77.9% after Treasury’s November 2008 TARP investment provided a warrant to purchase 
up 2% of AIG common stock (COP 2010, 71–72). The equity stake was decreased to maintain 
the FRBNY’s overall equity stake in AIG under 80% (COP 2010, 71–72). To read more 
information about the Series C Preferred Stock and the AIG Credit Facility Trust, please refer 
to Buchholtz and Lawson 2021b. 
14. The Commitment under the RCF was aggressively reduced over time. 
As mentioned in Key Design Decisions No. 12 the government extended the term of the RCF 
under the Second Restructuring Plan from a two-year to a five-year period, with a new 
maturity date of September 22, 2013. Yet, the Commitment was reduced in an aggressive 
manner, so that all loans outstanding under the RCF were repaid and the RCF terminated by 
January 14, 2011. According to Sarah Dahlgren, the reductions of the Commitment were all 
aimed at satisfying the credit rating agencies and, therefore, about “trying to get AIG to the 
right balance sheet structure, [and make AIG] an ongoing company that looked like a normal 
company” (YPFS 2018a).  
Formal reductions of the Commitment and repayment of outstanding loans were enacted 
through two restructurings and a Recapitalization Plan agreed to by AIG, the FRBNY, and 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
15 The “equity kicker” as originally conceived was also similar to the government’s terms in the rescues, 
earlier that month, of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, where the government received preferred stock for its 
loan commitments and also received warrants to purchase common stock representing 79.9 % of the 
common stock of each government-sponsored enterprise (Jester et al. 2018, 10; Millstein 2010, 71–72). In the 
Starr International case, the trial court found that the term sheet approved by the Board of Governors did not 
include key features; it originally stated that the form of equity would be warrants not convertible, nonvoting 








Treasury, which implemented amendments to the Credit Agreement and provided 
additional government investments in AIG. Restructurings “reduced AIG’s degree of 
indebtedness and improved its ability to cover interest payments,” two crucial aspects 
utilized by “the marketplace and rating agencies in assessing AIG’s future risk” (US GAO 
2011b, 129). Dahlgren stated that for any repayment toward the RCF through the 
restructurings, the FRBNY always considered the impact on the balance sheet’s capital 
structure, what AIG would look like to external parties like the credit rating agencies and 
investors, and how the government’s risk exposure would change (YPFS 2018a).  
The first formal decrease of the Commitment from $85 billion to $60 billion came after a 
large portion of Treasury’s TARP investment in November 2008 paid down part of AIG’s 
outstanding debt balance under the RCF (US GAO 2011b, 129). Per FRBNY officials, the 
announcement of this first restructuring was intended to coincide with the reporting of AIG’s 
third quarter results, assuming that quarterly losses would result in additional downgrades 
by rating agencies and would thus hinder the government’s and AIG’s effort to stabilize the 
company (US GAO 2011b, 52–53). 
The government aimed to reduce the Commitment and AIG’s outstanding loans under the 
RCF even further under the Second Restructuring Plan in March 2009. However, the debt 
reduction did not formally occur until December of that year, after the FRBNY accepted 
$25 billion worth of preferred interests in both the AIA SPV and the ALICO SPV (Webel 2017, 
14). According to Scott Alvarez, the FRB’s General Counsel, the FRB considered the SPVs 
“incidental to the collection of debt” under the banking concept of debt previously 
contracted, where the equity interest could be sold as a way of recouping debt on the RCF 
(YPFS 2018b). 
FRBNY officials stated that the March 2009 plan more heavily focused on “AIG’s asset sale 
plans and the performance of its insurance subsidiaries,” with credit ratings continuing to 
effect the FRBNY’s decisions surrounding AIG assistance (US GAO 2011b, 53). Based on an 
interview conducted by the GAO with an FRBNY advisor, on the Second Restructuring Plan 
(US GAO 2011b, 53): “… potential losses, combined with AIG’s deteriorating business 
performance, difficulties selling assets, and a volatile market environment, meant that a 
ratings downgrade was likely unless the government took additional steps to assist the 
company … a main rating agency concern was whether AIG could successfully execute its 
restructuring plan over the multiyear period envisioned.” 
Finally, the Recapitalization Plan reduced the Commitment to zero following the repayment 
of the RCF on January 14, 2011, well in advance of its September 2013 maturity date 
(Treasury 2011). For more details on the sources of the reductions, please refer to the 
Outcomes section and Figure 4. 
15. The FRBNY would exit the RCF only when AIG normalized operations. 
The FRBNY’s Head of the Supervisory Group, Sarah Dahlgren, said that the FRBNY’s 
investment would only be exited once AIG was believed to be stable, where it could operate 
as a “normal company.” According to Dahlgren, some people in the FRBNY believed that 
exiting the RCF sooner, within six months to a year, was in the best interest of protecting the 
taxpayer. However, it was also understood that unwinding the company through the sale of 
various assets to make AIG look like a normal company again would take time. Moreover, the 
FRBNY wanted to ensure that its exit would not leave AIG in a position where it would revert 
back to its original problems and eventually fail (YPFS 2018a). 
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The RCF was the first of many actions the US government took to rescue AIG. Although the 
government’s commitment of $85 billion was $10 billion more than the $75 billion proposed 
in the private sector solution, the $85 billion facility proved insufficient to meet AIG’s needs 
(COP 2010, 84). It was soon realized that the firm’s problems were not only liquidity 
constraints but also issues such as devaluation of assets that weakened it and risked 
downgrades (COP 2010, 84–87). The government extended new programs and interventions 
to AIG, just weeks following the RCF’s implementation, as cash collateral calls and liquidity 
drains only grew through the end of 2008 (SIGTARP 2009, Introduction). Additionally, two 
restructuring plans (November 2008 and March 2009) and a final Recapitalization Plan 
(September 2010) were implemented by the government over the RCF’s lifetime. Each 
significantly affected the RCF.  
It should be noted, however, that the RCF was an unprecedented undertaking by the Fed and 
was implemented at a time of  extreme stress for the financial system; the FRBNY had little 
information about AIG’s true financial situation. Given, this, it not so surprising that as the 
FRBNY learned more about the company’s real situation, changes were needed. 
The sheer size of the FRBNY and Treasury’s overall rescue of AIG, amounting to around $182 
billion, has been heavily criticized, as the funds came from taxpayer money and no one was 
sure whether AIG would be capable of repaying all loan amounts (US GAO 2011b, 
Summary).16 Many observers questioned why the Fed assisted AIG less than 24 hours after 
Lehman failed without government assistance. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi believed the 
“staggering sum” extended by the FRBNY to AIG was “just too enormous for the American 
people to guarantee” (Andrew, de la Merced, and Walsh 2008). One scholar has opined that 
it is likely the case that no matter how the FRBNY acted, its actions would have received 
criticism (Goodfriend 2011, 6–7). Whether the FRBNY provided a smaller loan, provided a 
larger loan, or did nothing at all, Congress was likely to get involved (Goodfriend 2011, 6–7).  
Still, the Obama Administration, Treasury, and the FRBNY viewed the overall intervention 
for AIG as reasonably successful, given that the firm avoided bankruptcy and ultimately 
repaid all amounts owed to the FRBNY and to AIG counterparties. Moreover, the government 
reported a net gain for taxpayers (Anderson 2012). Officials have characterized the RCF 
terms as “harsh,” “onerous,” and “punitive,” intended to force AIG’s hand to sell assets and 
downsize (US Court of Federal Claims 2015, 31–32). The government moved to ease such 
terms less than two months after the initial loan (US Court of Federal Claims 2015, 32). 
Nonetheless, while one FRBNY official has likened the RCF to debtor-in-possession financing, 
the official said that the terms were consistent with Section 13(3) because, if a loan is risky, 
there must be sufficient protection for the Reserve Bank making it (US GAO 2011b, 90). 
Another commenter has noted that AIG used much of the loans drawn under the RCF to pay 
off “debt holding counterparties, which were paid in full without giving up any formal 
reductions, where some of the $85 billion could have been saved were third-party bank 
creditors negotiated with” (Davidoff 2009). 
In a study conducted at the Berlin School of Economics and Law, researchers analyzed the 
decisions of the Federal Reserve  across a variety of programs and facilities and evaluated 
levels of effectiveness, transparency, availability of options, and consistency. The study 
concludes that the Fed’s decisions to save AIG and Bear Stearns (while letting Lehman fail) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
16 For a summary of the government’s overall rescue of AIG, please refer to Wiggins et al 2021. 
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were fairly effective (according to the study’s metrics), but the arguments by the Fed for the 
interventions were unconvincing, as the rescues did not help build trust toward market 
principles (Herr, Rüdiger, and Wu 2016, 205). The paper recognizes that the Fed considered 
that AIG’s core business of insurance was stable enough to be an attractive sale to investors, 
whereas no one in the market was attracted to Lehman’s offerings at the time (Herr, Rüdiger, 
and Wu 2016, 205). Thus, the decision to rescue AIG and Bear Stearns and let Lehman fail 
scored low on the study’s score system, representing a decision that was “justified and 
following the right intentions, but not satisfying in its results or involving too much risk on 
the taxpayers’ side and creating wrong incentives for market participants” (Herr, Rüdiger, 
and Wu 2016, 202). While evaluating the level of transparency, the researchers find that it 
was still unclear why the government saved AIG, pointing out that the Fed argued that there 
was “no time to follow a procedure following market principles” (Herr, Rüdiger, and Wu 
2016, 205). Transparency on the decision to rescue the financial institutions received the 
lowest possible score, with the study concluding that poor transparency contributed to 
market destabilization, as well as the public’s negative impression that the Fed was 
protecting Wall Street’s interests, not Main Street’s (Herr, Rüdiger, and Wu 2016, 205). 
Another paper by Jin Wook Choi assesses AIG’s rescue as a prime example of how the 
government encouraged a general sentiment of “too big to fail,” for a variety of reasons. First, 
Choi points out that the terms of borrowing were more favorable to AIG than any other 
financial institution during the financial crisis, especially following the First Restructuring 
Plan on November 10, 2008 (Choi 2013, 73). However, he makes no reference to the equity 
interest dilution included in the RCF, which others have argued made it a particularly 
stringent deal for AIG. Second, Choi argues that the entire sum of the rescue cost US taxpayers 
more money than needed (Choi 2013, 73). The FRBNY did not attempt to include any 
concessions or haircut discounts from AIG creditors, leaving the full burden of the cost on 
AIG shareholders and US taxpayers. AIG made payments, if not all, toward collateral calls and 
the unwinding of the CDS portfolios—which the RCF partially funded—at face value, instead 
of a lower market value (Choi 2013, 73). Finally, Choi points out that the government’s 
actions created a general moral hazard problem, where institutions may seek to continue 
risky behavior in the marketplace with the idea that the government will save them if market 
conditions became unstable (Choi 2013, 73).  
Contrary to Choi’s point of view, many others believe that the original terms of the Credit 
Agreement, the extension of an $85 billion credit line up-front, as well as the interest rates 
and fees attached, were actually a heavy burden for AIG (US Court of Federal Claims 2015, 
31–32). Though both the FRBNY and AIG came to an agreement, some have characterized 
the conditions of the original assistance as “relatively onerous terms with a high interest 
rate” (Webel 2009, Summary). To some, it seemed that the short duration of the loan of two 
years, with the interest rate and stringent commitment fee, was placing “a great deal of 
pressure on AIG to sell assets quickly, at deep discounts, in a weak market” (Salter 2013, 26). 
In order to alleviate those pressures, the threat from credit agencies of further downgrades, 
and mounting losses, the two parties restructured the Credit Agreement to slash the interest 
rate and commitment fee on undrawn funds of the RCF just a month and a half after its 
implementation (Salter 2013, 27). According to one Treasury official, reducing the AIG loan 
rate and implementing other facilities and investments in November 2008, was “the best way 
to stabilize AIG” and that “it gives the company the room it needs in its capital structure to 
execute its asset disposition plan” (Zuill 2008). 
Other scholars have characterized the RCF intervention as a “forced takeover” or as a “quasi-
nationalization” of AIG by the US government due to the Series C Preferred Stock and 
accompanying equity interest (Blinder 2013, 179). The inclusion of the Series C Preferred 
Stock in the Credit Agreement led one of AIG’s largest shareholders, Starr International 
Company (Starr), to bring a derivative suit against the government and AIG in 2011, alleging 
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that the government’s rescue of AIG, specifically its assuming almost 80% of the equity 
ownership, “constituted a taking without just compensation and an illegal exaction, both in 
violation of the Fifth Amendment to the US Constitution” (Starr v. United States and AIG 
2015, 1–2).  
The FRBNY argued that although AIG’s regulated subsidiaries and other assets secured the 
RCF, the “equity kicker” was necessary to ensure that it “provided a return to adequately 
compensate for the significant risk of lending to AIG” (HLR 2016, footnote 33). 
The trial court found that the FRBNY’s actions under the RCF amounted to an illegal exaction 
because (1) the Federal Reserve Act (FRA) did not authorize the bank to take a controlling 
interest in AIG, and (2)  the Trust was not independent but under the control of the FRBNY. 
(Starr v. United States and AIG 2015, 62–67).17 However, while the court found that the 
government’s actions were not justified, it also found that such actions “did not cause any 
economic loss to AIG shareholders.” (Starr v. United States and AIG 2015, 65–66). In the end, 
the court awarded zero damages to Starr, because it concluded that its AIG shares would 
have been worthless if the government not intervened (Starr v. United States and AIG 2015, 
65–66). 
Starr appealed the lack of damages to the Federal Circuit Court, which vacated the lower 
court’s decision on the basis that Starr did not have standing to bring the case because the 
“federal illegal exaction claim” on which the case was based belonged exclusively to AIG, not 
to its shareholders (Starr v. United States and AIG 2017, 3). Therefore, the case has no 
precedential value.  
Notably, in a separate opinion, concurring in part and supporting the majority’s opinion, 
Justice Wallach, writes that he would have found that the government’s actions were 
authorized under FRA Section 13(3) read together with Section 4(4)’s  incidental powers 
provisions, which do not prohibit the taking of equity as the term of a loan. Under his view, 
because he would have found the actions authorized, such actions could not be the basis of 
an illegal exaction claim. (Starr v. United States and AIG 2017, pdf 51-60)  Although Starr 
petitioned the Supreme Court to review the case, the court declined to hear it (Starr 
International Company, Inc. Petitioner v. United States 2017). 
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V. Key Program Documents 
Summary of Program 
Actions Related to AIG – page on Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s website covering 
highlights, timelines, and documents surrounding the Bank’s actions on AIG. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Actions%20Related%20to
%20AIG%20-%20FEDERAL%20RESERVE%20BANK%20of%20NEW%20YORK.pdf. 
June Oversight Report: The AIG Rescue (Congressional Oversight Report, June 10, 2010) – 
Congressional Oversight Panel released information on AIG’s rescue, highlighting hearing 




Credit Agreement (September 22, 2008) – document that authorized the extension of an $85 
billion Revolving Credit Facility from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to AIG and listed 
the terms of such a facility. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FRBNY_Credit_Agreement_2
0080922.pdf. 
Guarantee and Pledge Agreement (September 22, 2008) – agreement between Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York and AIG on the pledging of assets and subsidiaries in exchange for 
the access to credit. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/AIG%20Guarantee_pledge_a
greement.pdf. 
Amendment No. 1 to Credit Agreement (September 22, 2008) – document that amended the 
Credit Agreement to state that the execution of the terms of the Credit Agreement was to have 
taken place by September 25, 2008. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FRBNY_Amendment_No._1_t
o_Credit_Agreement_20080925.pdf. 
Amendment No. 2 to Credit Agreement (November 9, 2008) – document that amended the 
Credit Agreement to reduce the amount available in the RCF from $85 billion to $ 60 billion, as 




Amendment No. 3 to Credit Agreement (April 17, 2009) – document that amended the Credit 
Agreement to state that loan prepayments had to be made anytime on a date prior to 2:00 p.m. 
NYC time and included the Summary of Terms for the issuance of Series C Preferred Stock. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FRBNY_Amendment_No._3_t
o_Credit_Agreement_20090417_0.pdf. 
Amendment No. 4 to Credit Agreement (December 1, 2009) – document that amended the 
Credit Agreement to state that 100% of Net Cash Proceeds from stock issuance of AIA SPV, 
ALICO SPV, and their respective subsidiaries of AIA and ALICO would be applied to fees and 
loans on Credit Agreement and that dividends would be paid out to owners of equity interest in 
the SPVs, except for AIG and its subsidiaries. 
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AIG Credit Facility Trust Agreement (January 16, 2009) – agreement that established the AIG 
Credit Facility Trust as announced in the Credit Agreement, and the responsibilities and powers 
of the Trustees. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FRBNY_AIG_Credit_Facility_
Trust_Agreement_20090116.pdf. 
US Government Provides Support for Continued Restructuring of AIG (March 02, 2009) – 
news release that announced the restructuring plan for AIG, including the intent to establish 
two special purpose vehicles for AIA and ALICO and the issuance of preferred stock within each 
for the Federal Reserve, which would invest $26 billion in the SPVs. The amount of the Credit 
Facility was also drawn down to $35 billion. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/AIG_Press_Release_U.S._Gov
ernment_Provides_Support_For_Continued_Restructuring_Of_AIG_20090302_1.pdf. 
Series C Perpetual, Convertible, Participating Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement (March 
1, 2009) – purchase agreement entered into by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and AIG 
over the 100,000 shares of Series C Stock issued through the Certificate of Designations. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/AIG_Series_C_Preferred_Sto
ck_Purchase_Agreement_20090301_0.pdf. 
Series C Certificate of Designations (March 1, 2009) – document announcing the AIG’s intent 
to issue 100,000 shares of Series C convertible, preferred shares on March 4, 2009, in 
accordance with the Credit Agreement. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/AIG_Certificate_of_Designati
ons_Series_C_Preferred_Stock_20090301_0.pdf. 
ALICO Preferred Interest Purchase Agreement (June 25, 2009) – purchase agreement entered 
into by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and AIG for $9 billion in preferred shares of ALICO 
Holdings LLC to be issued when the SPV was established. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FRBNY_AIG_ALICO_Preferre
d_Interests_Purchase_Agreement_20090625.pdf. 
AIA Preferred Interest Purchase Agreement (June 25, 2009) – purchase agreement entered 
into by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and AIG for $16 billion in preferred shares of AIA 
Aurora LLC to be issued when the SPV was established. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/AIG_Press_Release_ALICO_A
IA_to_be_Placed_in_Special_Purpose_Vehicles_20090625.pdf. 
Second Amended and Restated Limited Liability Company Agreement of ALICO Holdings LLC 
(December 1, 2009) – document that effectively established the limited liability company 
special purpose vehicle, called ALICO Holdings LLC, for the AIG subsidiary of ALICO. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FRBNY_AIG_ALICO_Holding
s_LLC_Agreement_20091201.pdf. 
Fourth Amended and Restated Limited Liability Company Agreement of AIA Aurora LLC 
(December 1, 2009) – document that effectively established the limited liability company 








Recapitalization Plan Summary of Terms (September 30, 2010) – document explaining the 
terms of the full recapitalization of AIG and the effective termination of the Credit Facility 
through the net proceeds received from AIA IPO on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and the sale 
of ALICO to MetLife, Inc., as well as the repurchase of preferred shares in the AIA and ALICO 
SPVs by AIG from the Federal Reserve. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/US_Treasury_Recapitalizati
on_Plan_Summary_of_Terms_20100930.pdf. 
Master Transaction Agreement (December 8, 2010) – agreement between AIG, the ALICO SPV, 
the AIA SPV, Federal Reserve Bank, Treasury, and AIG Credit Facility Trust over the closing of 
the Recapitalization Plan announced on September 30, 2010, completing transactions of the 
repayment of the Credit Facility; conversion of Treasury preferred shares to common shares; 
the repurchase of preferred shares in SPVs by AIG; the termination of the AIG Credit Facility 
Trust; and delivery of any other certificates, agreements, or documents by all parties. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/US_Treasury_Master_Transa
ction_Agreement_20101208.pdf. 
Amended and Restated Purchase Agreement (January 14, 2011) – exchange agreement 
between Treasury and AIG to exchange Series F Stock from the Securities Purchase Agreement 
for preferred units in the AIA SPV and ALICO SPV, 20,000 shares of Series G Preferred Stock. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/AIG_Amended_Restated_Pur
chase_Agreement_20110114.pdf. 
Guarantee, Pledge, and Proceeds Application Agreement (January 14, 2011) – agreement 
between AIG and the AIA and ALICO SPVs in which the SPVs guaranteed the payment of all loans 
under Intercompany Loan Agreements that AIG itself could not make. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/AIG_Guarantee_Pledge_and_
Proceeds_Application_Agreement_20110114.pdf. 
Certificate of Elimination (January 14, 2011) – certificate that eliminated all of Treasury’s 




AIA Aurora LLC Intercompany Loan Agreement (January 14, 2011) – agreement between AIG 
and AIA SPV stating that AIA SPV would loan $19 billion to AIG, unsecured, for the purpose of 
repaying the outstanding amount under the Credit Agreement. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/AIG_AIA_Aurora_LLC_Interc
ompany_Loan_Agreement_20110114.pdf. 
ALICO Holdings LLC Intercompany Loan Agreement (January 14, 2011) – agreement between 
AIG and ALICO SPV stating that AIA SPV would loan $757 million to AIG, unsecured, for the 
purpose of repaying the outstanding amount under the Credit Agreement. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/AIG_ALICO_Holdings_LLC_In
tercompany_Loan_Agreement_20110114_0.pdf. 
Registration Rights Agreement (January 14, 2011) – agreement between AIG and Treasury 
whereby AIG would issue 1.655 billion shares of common stock to Treasury as part of the 
Recapitalization Plan, through the common stock held by the Trust from the Credit Agreement 
and the common stock converted from all other preferred shares Treasury received through 








Agreement to Amend Warrants (January 14, 2011) – agreement between AIG, the AIA SPV, 
the ALICO SPV, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Treasury, and AIG Credit Facility Trust 
to issue warrants to purchase common stock from November 25, 2008 (Securities Purchase 




Section 13 of the Federal Reserve Act – law that states authorizes the Federal Reserve to lend 




Board of Governors Announces Emergency Lending Revolving Credit Facility for AIG 
(September 16, 2008) – press release announcing the extension of an $85 billion credit line to 





Statement by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York Regarding AIG Transaction (September 
29, 2008) – statement on federal aid to AIG explaining the purpose of the loan and intent to 
stabilize AIG while maximizing value for taxpayers. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FRBNY_Statement_by_the_F
RBNY_Regarding_AIG_Transaction_20080929.pdf. 
Board of Governors Announces Restructuring of Financial Support to AIG (November 10, 
2008) – press release announcing a $40 billion investment through TARP in AIG and changes 
to the Credit Facility including reduction of the RCF to $60 billion, the reduction of the interest 
rate, reduction of the commitment fee, and extension to five years. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FRB_FRB_and_Treasury_De
partment_announce_restructuring_of_financial_support_to_AIG_20081110.pdf. 
Treasury Announces Investment in AIG Restructuring under the Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act (November 10, 2008) – press release announcing the purchase of $40 billion 
in senior preferred shares through TARP to help pay down the Credit Facility. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/US_Treasury_Treasury_to_I
nvest_in_AIG_Restructuring_Under_EESA_20081110_2.pdf. 
US Treasury and Federal Reserve Board Announce Participation in AIG Restructuring Plan 
(March 2, 2009) – joint press release announcing the First Restructuring Plan for AIG, which 
included investing in two special purpose vehicles for AIG subsidiaries AIA and ALICO, the 
removal of the interest rate LIBOR floor on the Credit Facility, and the issuance of Series C 
Preferred Stock from the Credit Agreement. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FRB_US_Treasury_and_FRB_
Announce_Participation_in_AIG_Restructuring_Plan_20090302.pdf. 
AIG Announces Placement of ALICO and AIA into Special Purpose Vehicles (June 25, 2009) – 
press release announcing issuance of $16 billion of preferred interests in AIA SPV and $9 billion 
of preferred interests in ALICO SPV to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, which aimed to 
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reduce the Credit Facility to $35 billion from $60 billion. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/AIG_Press_Release_ALICO_A
IA_to_be_Placed_in_Special_Purpose_Vehicles_20090625.pdf. 
AIG Closes Transactions to Form ALICO SPV and AIA SPV (December 1, 2009) – press release 
announcing the closure of transactions to transfer $25 billion in preferred interests in AIA and 




Treasury Update on AIG Investment Valuation (November 1, 2010) – Treasury 
announcement that the AIA IPO raised $20.5 billion in cash proceeds and ALICO’s sale raised 
$16.2 billion in total, $7.2 billion of which was in cash, where all cash proceeds would go to 
repayment on the Credit Facility. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/US_Treasury_Treasury_Upd
ate_on_AIG_Investment_Valuation_20101101.pdf. 
Treasury Announces the Completion of AIG’s Recapitalization (January 14, 2011) – Treasury 
announcement that AIG’s Recapitalization Plan was complete and the Credit Facility had been 





Fitch Announces a Downgrade in AIG’s Credit Rating (Fitch Ratings, September 15, 2008) – 
press release on Fitch’s downgrade of AIG and reasoning behind the rating. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Fitch_Fitch_Downgrades_AI
G_to_'A'_Remains_on_Rating_Watch_Negative_20080915.pdf. 
AIG: Pressure Mounts with Downgrades (CNN, September 16, 2008) – news report on AIG’s 
downgrades across the big three credit rating agencies. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/CNN_AIG_Pressure_Mounts_
with_Downgrades_20080921.pdf. 
Fed’s $85 Billion Loan Rescues Insurer (New York Times, September 16, 2008) – news article 
on the Federal Reserve’s decision-making process on extending an $85 billion loan to AIG. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/NYT_Fed's_$85_Billion_Loan
_Rescues_Insurer_20080917.pdf. 
AIG Reworks Bailout; Fed Ups Support to $150B, Lowers Interest Rate (Insurance Journal, 
November 09, 2008). 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Insurance_Journal_AIG_Rew
orks_Bailout_Fed_Ups_Support_to_$150B_Lowers_Interest_Rate_20081109.pdf. 
Short-Term Solutions to Long-Term Problems (New York Times, March 26, 2009) – news 
article discussing the federal government’s interventions during the crisis, specifically with AIG, 








AIA Shares Surge 17% in Hong Kong Debut (Financial Times, October 29, 2010) – news article 
on AIA IPO on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/AIA%20shares%20surge%
2017percent_Financial%20Times.pdf. 
Key Academic Papers 
The AIG Bailout (Sjostrom 2009). 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Afterword_AIG_Bailout_201
5.pdf. 








Annals of Crony Capitalism: Revisiting the AIG Bailout (Salter 2013). 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Salter_Harvard_University_
Annals_of_Crony_Capitalism_Revisiting_the_AIG_Bailout_20131205_0.pdf. 









Starr International Co. v. United States (Harvard Law Review 2016). 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Starr%20International%20
Co.%20v.%20United%20States%20-%20Harvard%20Law%20Review.pdf. 




AIG Form 8-K (US Securities and Exchange Commission, September 23, 2008) – AIG declared 
that its board of directors was suspending dividends on common stock. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/AIG_Form_8-
K_Suspension_of_Dividends_20080923.pdf. 
AIG Form 10-K (US Securities and Exchange Commission, March 2, 2009) – AIG filing of its 
2008 annual financial report to the SEC. 
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Ongoing Government Assistance for American International Group (AIG) (Webel 2009) – 
report by the Congressional Research Service describing the origin of AIG’s financial problems 
and assistance the government extended to AIG to save it from collapse. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Webel_Congressional_Resea
rch_Service_Ongoing_Government_Assistance_for_AIG_20090316.pdf. 
Troubled Asset Relief Program: Update of Government Assistance Provided to AIG 
(Government Accountability Office 2010). 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/GAO_TARP_Update_of_Gove
rnment_Assistance_Provided_to_AIG_201004.pdf. 
AIG Form 8-K (US Securities and Exchange Commission, September 30, 2010) – AIG’s 
material definitive agreement submitted to the SEC on the Recapitalization Plan for repayment 
to the FRBNY of the Revolving Credit Facility. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/AIG_Certificate_of_Eliminati
on_Series_C_Preferred_Stock_20110114_0.pdf. 
AIG Schedule 14C (US Securities and Exchange Commission, December 7, 2010) – AIG’s notice 




AIG Schedule 14A (US Securities and Exchange Commission, April 4, 2011) – AIG’s notice of 
an annual meeting of shareholders, scheduled for May 11, 2011. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/AIG_Schedule_14A_201104
04.pdf. 
Federal Reserve System: Opportunities Exist to Strengthen Policies and Processes for 
Managing Emergency Assistance (Government Accountability Office 2011). 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/GAO_Report_07-2011.pdf. 
Troubled Asset Relief Program: Government’s Exposure to AIG Lessens as Equity 









Appendix A - Timeline of Significant Events 
 
 
September 15, 2008:  Standard & Poor’s downgrades AIG from ‘AA-’ to ‘A-’ rating. 
Moody’s downgrades AIG from ‘AA3’ to ‘AA2’ rating. Fitch 
downgrades AIG from ‘AA-’ to ‘A-’ rating.  
 
September 16, 2008:  The Federal Reserve, with the support of Treasury, authorizes 
to extend an emergency credit facility to AIG, up to $85 billion, 
to prevent AIG’s failure by providing sufficient liquidity and 
“make appropriate dispositions of certain assets over time.” 
 
September 16-22, 2008 Prior to the RCF’s execution, the FRBNY advances $37 billion to 
AIG through a series of demand notes, 
 
September 22, 2008:  AIG and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York sign the official 
Credit Agreement and Guarantee and Pledge Agreement that 
implement the Revolving Credit Facility officially, with a 
maturity date of September 22, 2010. 
 
September 23, 2008:  The first amendment to the Credit Agreement is agreed upon, 
further defining the Borrower and Lender, with execution by 
officers of each to occur on September 25, 2008. 
 
November 10, 2008:  AIG and Treasury agree in principle, under the Troubled Asset 
Relief Program (TARP), for Treasury to purchase $40 billion in 
newly issued Series D Preferred Stock with limited class voting 
rights, reducing Treasury’s controlling equity interest from 
Series C Preferred Stock to 77.9%.  
 
November 10, 2008:  The second amendment to the Credit Agreement is agreed upon, 
reducing the amount available from the Revolving Credit 
Facility from $85 billion to $60 billion, as well as the interest 
rate to three-month LIBOR plus 3.0%, with a 3.5% LIBOR floor. 
The term length of the RCF is extended from two years to five 
years. 
 
January 16, 2009: The Federal Reserve Bank of New York announces the 
formation of the AIG Credit Facility Trust, headed by three 
independent trustees, which will hold the 77.9% equity interest 
in AIG and have absolute discretion over the issuance of 
dividends and stock payments. 
 
March 2, 2009: AIG and the Federal Reserve announce a joint press release, 
stating that two special purpose vehicles will be created for two 
of AIG’s largest life insurance subsidiaries, AIA and ALICO, 
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where the Federal Reserve Bank of New York will receive 
preferred interests and dividends “equal to a percentage of the 
fair market value” of the two subsidiaries. AIG also files a 
Certificate of Designations agreeing to issue 100,000 shares of 
Series C Preferred Stock. The Credit Agreement is also amended 
to remove the 3.5% LIBOR floor interest rate.  
 
 
March 4, 2009: Following the filing of the Certificate of Designations, AIG issues 
100,000 shares of Series C Preferred Stock, at $5.00 par value 
per share, equal to 79.9% voting power that will be received on 
conversion to common stock. The issuance of the Series C 




April 17, 2009:  The third amendment to the Credit Agreement is agreed upon, 
giving AIG “the right at any time and from time to time to prepay 
the Loans, in whole or in part, by giving telephonic notice to the 
Lender not later than 2:00 p.m. NYC time, the Required Number 
of Days prior to the proposed date of such prepayment.” “Each 
such telephonic notice of prepayment shall be confirmed 
promptly by email to the Lender.” 
 
 
June 25, 2009: The Federal Reserve Bank of New York releases Preferred 
Interest Purchase Agreements for AIG’s life insurance 
subsidiaries AIA and ALICO stating the terms of the purchases. 
 
June 30, 2009: The AIG Annual Meeting of Shareholders takes place, where 
common stockholders vote down the increase of common stock 
to more than 5 million. A vote passes to issue a 1:20 reverse 
stock split, giving way to allow the Trust to convert the Series C 
Preferred Stock into AIG common stock, equal to $23 million in 
value at the time. 
 
December 1, 2009:  The fourth amendment to the Credit Agreement is agreed upon, 
changing mandatory prepayments from the “fifth Business Day” 
to the “fifteenth Business Day” following the receipt of Net Cash 
Proceeds. Additionally, 100% of Net Cash Proceeds from the 
issuance of stock (or other disposition) in the AIA SPV and 
ALICO SPV, or their respective subsidiaries of AIA and ALICO, 
will be applied to the fees and expenses on the Credit Agreement 
and then paid out to owners of any equity interest (not including 
AIG and its subsidiaries) in the two SPVs. 
 
59




December 1, 2009: In accordance with the March 2, 2009, Second Restructuring 
Plan, AIG releases two Agreements to create two special 
purpose vehicles in the form of Limited Liability Companies 
from the common stock of AIA and ALICO, establishing AIA 
Aurora LLC and ALICO Holdings LLC. With the formation of the 
SPVs, the two Preferred Interest Purchase Agreements released 
on June 25, 2009, are closed, enabling the transfer of $16 billion 
in preferred shares through the AIA SPV and $9 billion in 
preferred shares through the ALICO SPV to the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York, thus reducing the amount available from the 
Revolving Credit Facility from $60 billion to $35 billion. 
 
March 1, 2010: AIG announces a definitive agreement for the sale of AIA Aurora 
LLC to Prudential plc for approximately $35.5 billion, of which 
$25 billion will be in cash, $8.5 billion in equity and equity-
linked securities, and $2 billion in Prudential preferred stock. 
AIG says proceeds will help to redeem preferred interests in the 
AIA SPV and repay some of the outstanding amount borrowed 
under the Revolving Credit Facility. 
 
March 8, 2010:  AIG announces that it will sell its subsidiary ALICO to MetLife, 
Inc. for $15.5 billion, of which $6.8 billion will be in cash. 
Proceeds from the sale will be used to help repay AIG’s 
outstanding balance on the Revolving Credit Facility. 
 
May 6, 2010: AIG announces the sale of HighStar Port Partners, L.P., reducing 
the amount under available under the Revolving Credit Facility 
to $34 billion. 
 
June 2, 2010: AIG files a termination of the sale agreement between AIA 
Aurora LLC and Prudential plc announced on March 1, 2010. 
 
August 6, 2010: AIG announces an initial public offering (IPO) for 67% of the AIA 
business on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, where proceeds 
from the IPO will be used to help repay AIG’s outstanding 
balance on the Revolving Credit Facility. 
 
August 20, 2010: AIG repays $3.95 billion in cash from the issuance of senior 
secured notes by International Lease Finance Corporation to the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York Revolving Credit Facility, 
reducing AIG’s outstanding principal balance to slightly more 
than $20 billion, inclusive of accumulated interest and fees. The 








September 30, 2010: Treasury, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and AIG Credit 
Facility Trust announce an agreement on a comprehensive 
Recapitalization Plan designed to repay all obligations to the US 
government, including all loans under the Credit Facility. 
 
October 29, 2010: AIG receives gross proceeds from the AIA IPO of $20.51 billion. 
 
November 1, 2010: AIG completes the sale of ALICO to MetLife at $16.2 billion, of 
which $7.2 billion will be in cash and the remainder provided in 
MetLife securities. 
 
December 8, 2010: Between AIG, the two SPVs of ALICO Holdings and AIA Aurora 
LLC, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Treasury, and the AIG 
Credit Facility Trust, a Master Transaction Agreement is filed in 
accordance with the terms set forth in the Recapitalization Plan, 
where the remaining debt under the Credit Facility will be 
repaid, exchanges between preferred interests in SPVs will 
facilitate the repayment, other preferred shares in AIG will be 
exchanged for common stock, and warrants will be issued to 
purchase shares of AIG common stock as agreed upon. 
 
January 14, 2011: The Federal Reserve Bank of New York announces that AIG has 
completed the repayment of all loans provided under the 
Revolving Credit Facility and that the RCF is hereby ended. 
Treasury exchanges its $49.1 billion in preferred shares, 
originally purchased from the TARP injection, into common AIG 
stock, increasing its ownership stake to roughly 92%, with 
shares to be sold off over time in the open market. The 
remainder of the Recapitalization Plan continues as scheduled. 
 
February 28, 2012: The remaining securities in the Maiden Lane II LLC portfolio are 
sold off by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, for a net gain 
of $2.8 billion off its management of the MLII portfolio.  
 
July 23, 2012:  The remaining securities in the Maiden Lane III LLC portfolio 
are sold off by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, for a 
reported net gain of $6.6 billion off its management of the MLIII 
portfolio. This marks the end of government assistance related 
to AIG during the crisis. 
 
December 11, 2012: Treasury sells its remaining shares of AIG common stock, 
reducing the government’s equity stake in AIG to zero. Treasury 
reports a net gain of about $51 billion from the sales of 1.655 
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